Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation Building in an Experimental Helping Game by Engelmann, Dirk & Fischbacher, Urs
!"#$%$&$'()*+(,-.%+%/01(2'#'0+/3(%"(,/*"*-%/#
4"%5'+#%$6(*)(7&+%/3
8*+9%":(;0.'+(<'+%'#
!<<=(>?@?A0?CD
8*+9%":(;0.'+(=*E(>F@
!"#$%&'()*&'$+%,'$(-)."#)/(%.(&0$')*&+1(.($,"
21$3#$"0)$").")45+&%$6&"(.3)7&3+$"0)8.6&
G%+9(,":'1-0""(0"H(4+#(I%#/3J0/3'+
=*5'-J'+(@00@
Indirect Reciprocity and Strategic Reputation
Building in an Experimental Helping Game!
Dirk Engelmann† and Urs Fischbacher‡
November 8, 2002
Abstract
We study indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an
experimental helping game. At any time only half of the subjects can
build a reputation. This allows us to study both pure indirect reciprocity
that is not contaminated by strategic reputation building and the impact
of incentives for strategic reputation building on the helping rate. We find
that while pure indirect reciprocity appears to be important, the helping
choice seems to be influenced at least as much by strategic considerations.
Strategic do better than non-strategic players and non-reciprocal do better
than reciprocal players, casting doubt on previously proposed evolutionary
explanations for indirect reciprocity.
1 Introduction
Among the recent approaches to conceive a more realistic model of human be-
havior by extending economic theory by aspects that go beyond narrow self-
interest, reciprocity has been prominent, both in theoretical (e.g. Rabin, 1993,
Falk and Fischbacher, 1999) and experimental work (e.g. Berg, Dickhaut, and
McCabe, 1995, Fehr, Kirchsteiger, and Riedl, 1993). It is still an open ques-
tion whether reciprocal actions, i.e. rewarding of friendly acts and punishment
of hostile acts, result from a motivation for reciprocity (as in Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger, 2000) or rather from other-regarding preferences (as in the models
by Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000, and Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Direct evidence
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that a motive for reciprocity plays a role, in particular for negative reciprocal
behavior, is provided, for example, by Cox (2002), Blount (1995) and Charness
(2002).
The focus of the literature has so far been almost exclusively on direct reci-
procity, where a person that is a!ected by the choice of another person, can
directly reward or punish the latter. In contrast, the focus of our experimental
study is indirect reciprocity, where friendly or hostile acts of one person to-
wards another are rewarded or punished by a third party.1 The term “indirect
reciprocity” was introduced by Alexander (1987). He argues that individuals’
behavior towards others is not only influenced by their own experience but also
by their observations of other’s behavior. According to Alexander, indirect reci-
procity works through reputation and status and provides the evolutionary basis
for moral systems prescribing cooperation. Indeed, in large societies repeated
direct interaction is quite unlikely and hence there is little scope for direct reci-
procity. Incentives for adherence to a social norm can thus only be provided by
indirect reciprocity based on reputation.
The models by Levine (1998) and by Charness and Rabin (2002) can also
be interpreted as models of both direct and indirect reciprocity. In the model
by Levine (1998) the intensity of empathy towards another person depends on
the altruism of that person. This altruism can, for example, be inferred from
the behavior towards a third person, implying indirect reciprocity. In Charness
and Rabin (2002) people are assumed to exhibit “concern withdrawal”, i.e. they
assign a lower (or even negative) weight to another person’s payo! in the own
utility function if that person has not well behaved, which could, for example,
mean to have mistreated a third person.
Harbaugh (1998) argues (and provides supporting field data) that donations
to charity are in part driven by a prestige motive. The benefit of such prestige
might come from indirect reciprocity, because donations might be rewarded by
outside observers. Indeed, Milinski et al. (2002b) have shown that in an ex-
periment donations to UNICEF are rewarded by other players. This allows for
important e!ects of strategic behavior. If at least some others are indirectly re-
ciprocal, it can pay to strategically build a reputation for being generous. This
in turn allows a potential recipient of a donation to increase the revenues by
publishing donations. The latter should increase future returns of the donor
on his contribution and hence his incentive to give. Apparently charities are
aware of the prestige motive (which might be driven by expectations of indi-
rect reciprocity) since it is common practice to announce donors’ names and
contributions.2 The interaction of indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation
1An alternative model of indirect reciprocity is that a person that has been helped then
helps a third party. Boyd and Richerson (1989) and Heijden (1996) study this form of indirect
reciprocity in small cyclical networks.
2Andreoni and Petrie (2001) provide further experimental evidence on the prestige motive.
They show that subjects, when having the options to contribute both to an anonymous and a
broadcast public good, overwhelmingly choose the latter. Beyond indirect reciprocity, reputa-
tion building can be crucial for the functioning of markets with repeated one-shot interactions.
This is increasingly relevant in markets that are becoming larger and more anonymous and
hence less prone to be influenced by direct reciprocity as is exemplified by e-commerce. Bolton
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building can thus have substantial impact on economically relevant interaction.
Looking for explanations for the existence of indirect reciprocity, Nowak and
Sigmund (1998a) have conducted simulations of an evolutionary process based
on a repeated so-called helping game (a degenerate game where a donor can
help a recipient at a cost smaller than the recipient’s benefit). The previous be-
havior of the recipient is reflected in a so-called image score, that the donor can
observe. This game is nicely suited to study indirect reciprocity because it pre-
cludes (in anonymous su"ciently large groups) any e!ects of direct reciprocity
as opposed to games such as the prisoner’s dilemma. They find that maximally
discriminating players will eventually take over the population.3 Leimar and
Hammerstein (2001), however, show that this result is based on a too restricted
initial set of available strategies. They show that subjects who are not indi-
rectly reciprocal but only help in order to keep their own score at a level that
induces a high probability of being helped (and hence base their decision only
on their own score), could invade and take over a population of image scorers
(i.e. players who base their choice only on the recipient’s score).4 Hence such
strategic reputation building could undermine a cooperative society based on
indirect reciprocity.
To assess the interplay of indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation build-
ing, and hence the plausibility of the proposed evolutionary explanations for co-
operative behavior, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between helping choices
based on indirect reciprocity and those based on strategic reputation building.
An experimental design that achieves this aim thus has to allow us to identify
whether observed helping choices are motivated by strategic reputation building
or by indirect reciprocity that is not contaminated by incentives for strategic
reputation building by the donor, which we call pure indirect reciprocity.
Our experiment was designed for this purpose. We investigate a helping
game where in any period only half of the players have a public image score,
the record of their previous behavior. In particular, each subject has a public
image score either in the first 40 periods of the experiment or in the last 40
periods. This allows us to identify the motivation behind the helping choices.
First, since donors without a public image score interact with recipients with a
public image score, we can study pure indirect reciprocity uncontaminated by
incentives for strategic reputation building. Second, by comparing the behavior
et al. (2002) and Keser (2002) provide experimental evidence on the importance of reputation
mechanisms in the latter environment.
3For a helping game where the image score is based only on the last decision, Nowak
and Sigmund (1998b) have shown analytically that discriminators outperform altruists and
defectors but that cycles occur due to invasion of discriminator populations by altruists, which
in turn yields an advantage to defectors.
4Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) also study strategies that use both the own and the re-
cipient’s score. For a case with perfect information they find that a type who is maximally
discriminating with respect to the recipient’s score but in addition only helps if the own score
is threatening to fall below this threshold, is most frequent. Leimar and Hammerstein (2001),
however, argue, using comparable simulations, that this result requires either a substantial
influence of genetic drift or a very small cost of helping. Even in the latter case, cooperative
image scorers are invaded by sophisticated strategic subjects who build, based on previous
experience, a belief whether it pays to have a positive image score.
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of donors with and without public scores, we can evaluate the relative impact
of strategic reputation building on the helping rates. Our design allows us to
study the latter issue even within subjects.
Our design is in part based on that of Seinen and Schram (2001) who have
conducted an experimental helping game similar to the one studied by Nowak
and Sigmund (1998a).5 The fundamental di!erence is our introduction of players
with and without score. Seinen and Schram (2001) find that indirect reciprocity
is important, since many donors base their helping decision on the image score
of the recipient. A substantial part of the donors, however, also base their
decision on their own image score, indicating that strategic reputation building
is a major force as well. In the main treatment observability of the recipient’s
score implies that the donor’s score will be observable in the future as well.
Therefore, the design of Seinen and Schram (2001) does not allow to study pure
indirect reciprocity uncontaminated by strategic concerns. It is also di"cult to
get a clear idea of the overall impact of strategic reputation building. While
they find that a substantial part of subjects base their decisions at least in part
on their own score, it is not possible to clearly determine the share of helping
choices that are due to strategic reputation building. Hence it is unclear to what
extent the invasion predicted by Leimar and Hammerstein (2001) is reflected in
the data. These issues were, however, not the focus of their study as it is in
ours.
We test three hypotheses. First, indirect reciprocity is important, i.e. the
probability that donors help increases in the recipient’s image score. Second,
subjects strategically build a reputation, i.e. for any given score of the recipient
(including an absent score) the average helping rate of donors with a public
image score is higher than that of donors without. Third, strategic reputation
building weakens the reciprocal relation, i.e. the dependence of the donor’s help-
ing rate on the recipient’s score is weaker for donors with a public score than
for donors without.
We find support for all three hypotheses. There is a clear positive relation
between helping rates and recipients’ scores for both donors with and without
a public score. The latter provides evidence for indirect reciprocity even in the
absence of strategic incentives for reputation building, hence for pure indirect
reciprocity. Our experiment thus provides, to the best of our knowledge, the first
evidence of pure indirect reciprocity in the laboratory.6 The average helping
rate of donors with a public score is, however, more than twice the average
helping rate of donors without. Hence strategic reputation building plays an
important role as well. There is also clear evidence on an individual level. 80%
of the subjects help clearly more often when they have a score than when they
5Wedekind and Milinski (2000) provide the first experimental test of the Nowak and Sig-
mund model, based on only six periods. They find support for indirect reciprocity in the
sense that recipients who are helped have higher scores on average than recipients who are
not helped. Furthermore, donors who rarely help rather do so when the recipient has a high
image score.
6We also find substantial helping rates (32%) in interactions where neither the donor nor
the recipient has a score. This suggests that motives like altruism or e"ciency concerns play
an important role as well.
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do not, including 25% who never help when they do not have a public score,
but often help when they have a public score. The mode of donors’ public
scores is at 4 helping decisions out of the last 5 decisions. This score is the
expected payo! maximizing score in all five sessions. In contrast, if scores are
not public, the mode is clearly at 0. Payo!s relative to group averages are clearly
higher for strongly strategic subjects (whose helping rates are generally at least
doubled when they have a score) than for the weakly strategic subjects (whose
helping rates are not substantially higher when they have a score). They are
also higher for the non-reciprocal than for the reciprocal subjects (though not
significantly). This would be consistent with the invasion argument by Leimar
and Hammerstein (2001) and casts some doubt on the evolutionary explanation
for indirect reciprocity suggested by Nowak and Sigmund (1998a).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the helping game and
the experimental design. The results are presented in Section 3, followed by a
discussion of related literature in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes our results
and provides concluding remarks.
2 Experimental Design
We conducted a computerized repeated helping game similar to the game studied
by Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) and Seinen and Schram (2001). The experimen-
tal software was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999) and the experiments
where run in the computer laboratory at the Institute for Empirical Research in
Economics of the University of Zurich in Fall 2001. Participants were students
from a variety of fields from the University of Zurich and the ETH Zurich and
were recruited by telephone. They were randomly assigned to seats in the labo-
ratory. Instructions were provided in written form and participants could read
through them at their own pace (see the appendix for an English translation).
Donor and recipient roles were labeled A and B in the instructions, but the help-
ing choices was labeled as such, because we considered the game structure so
obvious, that the use of the word “help” would not invoke any interpretations
that subjects would otherwise not come up with. More neutral terminology
would instead appear plainly artificial. At the end of the instructions there
were five control questions to check that participants had understood the key
features of the experiment. The experiment started when all participants had
answered all the control questions correctly and after an oral summary of the
instructions had been given.
There were 16 subjects in each of our five experimental sessions. The helping
game was repeated for 80 periods. In each period the subjects were randomly
matched (independently between periods) in pairs and the role of donor and
recipient were randomly assigned. The donor had the choice whether or not to
help the recipient at a cost of 6 “Taler”, which yielded a benefit of 15 Taler
for the recipient. The recipient had no choice to make. Of course, classical
game theory based on common knowledge of narrow selfishness and rationality
implies no help in the one-shot game and by backward induction for the finitely
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repeated game. For an infinitely repeated helping game, however, folk-theorem
arguments yield many di!erent Nash-equilibria, including one where all players
choose the strategy to help if and only if the recipient has a perfect score and
on the equilibrium path all players then help.
Each subject had a public score either in the first 40 periods or in the last
40 periods. All subjects were informed about this before the start of the ex-
periment. The common knowledge of this change of roles ensured that subjects
were in a symmetric position and hence it precluded that donors with and with-
out score behaved di!erently because they considered themselves advantaged or
disadvantaged.7 A public score consisted of the number of times the subject had
helped and had not helped in the last 5 times as a donor. In case the subject
had so far been in the role of the donor less than 5 times, the score consisted
of the total number of help and not help decisions so far. When the recipient
had a public score, the donor was informed about this score before making the
decision to help. A subject with a public score was also informed about the
own score. In case the subject did not have a public score, no score informa-
tion was displayed (but of course, subjects could easily keep track of their own
score). The experimental software did, however, record the hypothetical scores
to allow an easy comparison of the choices with and without score. A score
that is based on more than the last period allows in principle for punishments,
because a player who generally helps can occasionally punish a free-rider with-
out being punished himself if the indirectly reciprocal players do not demand a
perfectly clean record. It is, however, impossible with our information structure
to distinguish punishment from occasional defection.
From the second period on, subjects were informed about the outcome of
the last period at the same time they were asked to make a decision or were
informed that they were a recipient. The upper part of the screen reviewed their
role in the preceding period, the donor’s decision and the resulting payo! and
total payo! so far, as well as the own score if they had a public score in that
half of the experiment. A donor was asked for his choice in the lower part of
the screen and there he was either informed about the score of the recipient or
that the recipient did not have a public score. A recipient was only informed
about his role and that he did not have to make a choice. Following period 40,
the roles of subjects with and without public score were switched and the scores
were set to 0.
At the end of the experiment Taler were converted into Swiss Francs at a
rate of 1 Taler = 0.1 Swiss Franc. Subjects started the experiment with an
endowment of 100 Taler, corresponding to a show-up fee of 10 Swiss Francs. No
additional show-up fee was paid. The sessions took between 64 and 81 minutes
and earnings ranged from 6.40 to 55.60 Swiss Francs with an average of 29.36
Swiss Francs (including the 10 Francs initial endowment).
7While subjects might have considered having a score advantageous or disadvantageous,
they knew that they would not be advantaged or disadvantaged over the whole course of
the experiment. In a design that simply mixed subjects with and without score, behavioral
di!erences between them might be caused by feelings of being assigned to the inferior role.
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Figure 1: Donors’ average help rate for all recipients with a public score based
on at least one decision
3 Experimental Results
The overall experimental results are displayed in Figures 1 and 2, that show the
average helping behavior of donors with and without score for di!erent public
scores of the recipients. The latter are represented as the relative number of
helping choices, i.e. the number of helping choices in the last five help decisions
divided by five, or if the score was based on less than five choices, the number of
helping choices divided by the total number of choices (and rounded to multiples
of 0.2). In Figure 1 all choices where recipients had a public score based on at
least one decision are included, in Figure 2 only the decisions where recipients
had a full score, i.e. a score based on five decisions. Average helping rates for
the individual sessions by score status of donors and recipients are presented in
Table 1 (for all scores of the recipients aggregated and only including recipients
with a full, or full hypothetical, score). Table 1 shows in particular that helping
rates are quite high (32%) even when neither the donor nor the recipient has
a score, i.e. where indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building cannot
play a role. This suggests that additional motives like altruism or e"ciency
concerns are important as well.
Figures 1 and 2 provide immediate support for the first hypothesis that
donors are indirectly reciprocal and in particular for the existence of pure indi-
rect reciprocity. The helping rate of donors both with and without public score
clearly increases with the image score of the recipient, although the relation is
monotone only in the case where donors do not have a score and recipients have
a full score. A straightforward statistical test confirms the significance of this
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Figure 2: Donors’ average help rate for recipients with full public score
positive relation. We estimate a simple linear probability model
Helpj = const+ ! ·RsScorej + "j,
with Help a dummy that is 1 if the donor helps the recipient and RsScore
the recipient’s score. Under the H0 hypothesis that donors do not condition
the helping decision on the recipient’s score, the probability that the estimated
coe"cient for the recipient’s score is positive is (slightly less than) 12 . Hence
the probability for a positive coe"cient in all five sessions is (slightly smaller
than)
!
1
2
"5
= 132 < 5%. Since we find a positive coe"cient in all five sessions we
can thus reject the H0 that there is no positive relation at the 5% level.8 This
holds independently of whether we include all recipients with a score or only
the recipients with a full score and whether we consider donors with or without
score (see Table 2).9
The a"rmative result for the first hypothesis can also be derived from a
panel data analysis (with the sessions as independent units of observations).
The model is
Helpit = const+ ! ·RsScoreit + #i + "it,
8The same logic will apply to all our non-parametric tests below. Since all our hypotheses
are directed, we can apply one-sided tests throughout.
9The linear probability model may not be the ideal model to analyze the dependence of
the help rate on the recipient’s score. Here, however, we only use it to provide us with an
input for the simple non-parametric test whether there is a positive relation between the
recipient’s score and the help probability. For this test it is also irrelevant if coe"cients are
not significantly di!erent from 0, as long as they are positive.
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Session 1 2 3 4 5 Total
R with D with score 72% 78% 70% 66% 86% 74%
score D without score 45% 42% 22% 27% 49% 37%
R without D with score 72% 66% 63% 66% 75% 69%
score D without score 46% 32% 13% 21% 47% 32%
Table 1: Average help rates by score status of donors (D) and recipients (R),
recipients with full score only
Session 1 2 3 4 5
All All donors
.56
(8.1)
.59
(6.4)
.47
(6.1)
.51
(5.2)
.57
(3.9)
recipients donors with score
.55
(8.7)
.58
(9.2)
.52
(8.3)
.43
(4.4)
.34
(2.2)
with score donors without score
.53
(7.0)
.75
(10.2)
.36
(4.7)
.64
(8.9)
.66
(4.5)
recipients All donors
.65
(9.0)
.74
(8.8)
.51
(5.3)
.46
(3.9)
.72
(5.7)
with full donors with score
.60
(7.6)
.62
(8.3)
.44
(3.7)
.30
(1.3)
.32
(1.3)
score donors without score
.69
(10.8)
.93
(13.7)
.49
(6.8)
.69
(10.8)
.87
(7.2)
Table 2: Coe"cients for recipient’s score in linear probability model for helping
choice. Adjusted R2 (in percent) in parantheses.
with, as above, Help a dummy that is 1 if the donor helps the recipient and
RsScore the recipient’s score. We again run the regression separately for donors
with and without score, to be able to detect whether a reciprocal relation might
be restricted to one group of donors. Table 3 list the estimates for the coef-
ficients, the standard errors, z-statistics and p-values. No matter whether we
include all recipients with a score or restrict the analysis to those with a full
score, both for donors with and without scores the coe"cient for the recipient’s
score is positive and highly significant (p < 0.1%). Obviously, the same results
if we run the regression jointly for all donors with and without score.
Figures 1 and 2 as well as Table 1 provide clear support for the second
hypothesis that donors try to strategically build a reputation. The average
helping rate of donors with score is higher than of those without for any score
of the recipient (including absent score, as can be seen from Table 1).10 The
same holds for each individual session. In case only recipients with full score are
10 If the analysis is restricted to recipients with full score, then the helping rate of both
donors with and without score is 0 for recipients with a score 0. There are, however, only 13
interactions with a recipient with a full score of 0. 12 of these are with the same subject and
hence all in session 1. Furthermore, since the helping rate for donors without score is already
0 for recipients with a score of 0.2, this tie appears to simply result from censoring.
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Coe"cient Std. Error z Pr > |z|
Donors All R with ! 0.5176 0.0669 7.732 0.000
with score const 0.3671 0.0542 6.774 0.000
scores R with ! 0.5075 0.0851 5.965 0.000
full score const 0.3630 0.0665 5.460 0.000
Donors All R with ! 0.5558 0.0688 8.081 0.000
without score const -0.0489 0.0672 -0.728 0.467
scores R with ! 0.7190 0.0817 8.803 0.000
full score const -0.1702 0.0688 -2.474 0.013
Table 3: Coe"cients for the recipient’s score (!) in random e!ects cross-
sectional time-series regression for the help choice
Coe"cient Std. Error z Pr > |z|
All R ! 0.5319 0.0485 10.963 0.000
with $ 0.3885 0.0224 17.323 0.000
score const -0.0326 0.0461 -0.709 0.478
R with ! 0.6487 0.0590 10.992 0.000
full $ 0.3779 0.0256 14.752 0.000
score const -0.1210 0.0474 -2.550 0.011
Table 4: Coe"cients for the recipient’s score (!) and for a dummy whether the
donor has a score ($) in random e!ects cross-sectional time-series regression for
the help choice
considered, there is only one tie, in session 1 for a score of 0. Such a dominance
of the helping rate of donors with a score over that of donors without a score
occurs in one session under the H0 hypothesis that strategic reputation building
is not relevant certainly with probability less than 12 . Thus the fact that it holds
in all five sessions allows us to reject the H0 at the 5% level.
This result as well is supported by a panel data analysis. We extend the
above model to
Helpit = const + ! ·RsScoreit + $ ·DWithScoreit + #i + "it,
with DWithScore a dummy that takes the value 1 if the donor has a score and
0 otherwise. Both running the regression for all recipients with a score or only
for those with a full score, yields a highly significant (p < 0.1%) coe"cient for
the dummy, supporting the second hypothesis (see Table 4).
As can be seen in Table 1, in each session for both recipients with and
without score the helping rates of donors with score is about twice the helping
rate of donors without score. Hence the impact of strategic reputation building
is not only statistically significant, but also of substantial magnitude. On the
other hand, both for donors with and without score, the average helping rate is
only slightly (about 5%) lower if the recipient does not have a score than when
he does. Hence recipients without a score are treated roughly as if they had an
10
Session
Score
1 2 3 4 5 Total
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.2 -0.6 2.9 0.57 -0.6 -0.6 0.57
0.4 0.55 0.91 1.11 1.03 2.3 1.03
0.6 2.1 1.2 1.22 0.87 1.8 1.39
0.8 2.52 3.01 1.51 2.63 2.85 2.42
1 2.07 2.48 1.11 0.81 2.62 1.92
Table 5: Average expected return per period (in Taler) from keeping a certain
score, based on average help rates over the whole phase with full scores
average score. This indicates that donors do not create any self-serving beliefs
that recipients about whom they do not receive information are not helpful,
which in turn could justify not to help these recipients.
The importance of strategic reputation building is also very vividly illus-
trated by Figure 3 that shows the distribution (absolute frequencies on top of
bars) of donors’ full (public or private) scores.11 The dark bars show the dis-
tribution for donors without public score and the light bars for donors with
public scores. In the former case, the mode is with about 40 % at a score of 0,
with almost a uniform distribution over the remaining scores. For public scores,
in contrast, the mode of the distribution is at a relative score of 0.8 (i.e. 4),
with few cases of scores below 0.6 and hardly any below 0.4.12 Interestingly, in
all sessions the score that maximizes expected payo!s for the observed helping
rates is 0.8 (see Table 5). This implies that either many subjects manage to
strategically optimize their score, or that many subjects use the most prevalent
score as cut-o! point. As Table 5 shows, it appears in general optimal to keep
the score at or close to 0.8 (this analysis does not take time trends into account,
the optimal score is calculated based on average help rates over the whole phase
with full scores). The high returns on a score of 0.2 in session 2 and on 0.4 in
session 5 can be attributed to low numbers of observations.
An advantage of our design is that we can also study the importance of
strategic reputation building on an individual basis by comparing the helping
rates with and without score within subjects. Table 6 shows a classification of
subjects. We call a subject strategic if the helping rates are generally higher in
11We included all full scores following the donor’s decision, except for scores resulting from
a donor’s decision in the last period, because in that case the resulting score could not possibly
be relevant for future interaction. The total number of the included scores is 2480, 1227 where
the score is public and 1253 where the score is private (the di!erence is a result of the random
allocation of donor and recipient roles, apparently it just happened that players with a private
score were chosen slightly more often as donors). Since participants could be a donor (or a
recipient) several periods in a row, some of these scores may have never (or several times)
been observed.
12Of the 19 full scores of 0, 15 come from same subject, the only pure egoist. In all five
sessions the mode for private scores is 0. For public scores the mode is 0.8 in three sessions. In
one session the mode is 0.6 and in one session it is 1, with 0.8 being the second most frequent
score in both cases.
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Figure 3: Distribution of public and private (post-decision) donors’ scores for
all interactions where the donor had a full score (except for following donors’
decisions in the last period). Absolute numbers on top of bars.
the part of the experiment where the subject has a score than in the part where
he or she does not. A subject is called strongly strategic if the helping rates with
score are in most cases at least twice the helping rate without score.13 Finally,
a pure strategist never helps when he or she does not have a score, but does
so several times otherwise.14 There are several special cases of non-strategic
subjects. Simple egoists never help, simple altruists always help and negatively
reciprocal altruists always help when the recipient does not have a score or when
the recipient’s score is above some cut-o! level, but not for a lower score. A
subject is classified as reciprocal when there is a clear positive relation between
the recipient’s score and the helping rate.15
As Table 6 shows, the majority of subjects is clearly strategic, there are
13For the classification of both strategic and strongly strategic, we allowed deviations from
the criteria for one value of the recipient’s score and in that case required it to hold strictly
for at least two values of the recipient’s score. In particular we required the criterium to hold
for the case where the recipient did not have a score, because the number of observations was
much higher than for any single recipient’s score.
14Note that the pure strategists were not included in the strong strategists.
15We allowed one exception from the criterium in the sense that for one low score the
helping rate was allowed to be higher than for one or several higher scores or for one high
score the helping rate was allowed to be lower than for one or several lower scores. In these
cases we required at least two either low scores where the helping rate was lower than that for
all higher scores or high scores where the helping rate was higher than for each lower score.
A flat helping rate in case the donor did not have a score was allowed if the helping rate in
case he did have a score showed a clear positive relation. For most subjects, the classification
was straightforward, because there was either a clear monotone relation or none at all.
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Pure Strat Strong Str. Weak Str. Non-Str. Total
Reciprocal 8 12 14 4 (5) 38 (39)
Non-Reciprocal 12 11 7 6 (11) 36 (41)
Simple Egoist 1 1
Simple Altruist 4 4
Negativ Rec. Altr. 1 1
Total 20 23 21 16 80
Table 6: Classification of individual subjects (in absolute numbers). Numbers
in parantheses include special types of reciprocal (negatively reciprocal altruist)
and non-reciprocal (simple egoist and simple altruist) non-strategic types which
are listed separately below.
only 16 (20%) non-strategic types, but even 20 pure strategists and 23 strong
strategists. The distribution of types does not depend substantially on whether
the subjects have a score in the first or the second half of the experiment. It
also does not di!er a lot between sessions, but the concentration of pure and
strong strategist is especially high (75%) in session 3. Interestingly, session
3 also has the highest number of reciprocal subjects (62.5%). There is only
one simple egoist, and even more surprisingly only one negatively reciprocal
altruist, which intuitively appears to be a perfectly reasonable and in particular
socially desirable type (helps in general but punishes egoists). Some of the
4 simple altruists might be negatively reciprocal altruists, because they never
encountered a recipient with a score below 0.4. Overall, the number of these
simple types is much lower than in Seinen and Schram (2001), who find 11%
egoists and 36% altruists.16 Thus we find a higher share of subjects that are
reciprocal but also a higher share that are strategic. Interestingly, 40% of the
pure strategists and 52% of the strong strategist are also clearly reciprocal.
Hence while their primary motive to help appears to be strategic reputation
building, they are also concerned with providing incentives for the other subjects
and hence instead of just exploiting the cooperative system based on indirect
reciprocity, they also stabilize it.17 The remaining 60% of pure strategists (15%
of the total population), however, appear to be of the type predicted by Leimar
and Hammerstein (2001) to invade the population.
Concerning the third hypothesis that the reciprocal relation is weaker for
donors with score than for donors without, Figures 1 and 2 do not provide
immediate support. We do, however, find support for this hypothesis if we
take a closer look at the data. If we focus on the recipients with a full score
(which appears appropriate, because the preceding interactions are subject to
more random influence due to initial experimentation of donors), then Table 2
16The numbers are, however, not perfectly comparable, because we use a di!erent classi-
fication than Seinen and Schram (2001). In particular, our design allows us to more clearly
detect strategic players and hence our classification is finer in that respect.
17This can be seen as being strategic on a higher level, because due to the matching pro-
cedure, donors could profit from inducing others to help, either by later being matched with
them again or by indirect e!ects.
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shows that in each session the coe"cient of the recipient’s score in the linear
probability model is higher for donors without score than for donors with score.
Hence the relation between the recipient’s score and the helping probability is
stronger for donors without score than for donors with score in each session, and
thus overall is significantly stronger for the donors without score at p = 5%.We
can also address this question by a second measure, the adjusted R2 for each
regression. As is shown in Table 2, the adjusted R2 is higher for the donors
without a score than for the donors with a score in each session, and hence
overall, the recipient’s score is a (significantly) better predictor for the helping
probability if the donor does not have a score.18 If we consider all recipients
with a score, however, both these tests fail and hence the overall support for
the third hypothesis is weaker than for the first two hypotheses.
These result are again supported by a panel data analysis. We further extend
the above model to
Helpit = const+ ! ·RsScoreit + $ ·DWithScoreit
+% · (DWithScore"RsScore)it + #i + "it,
the interaction term capturing the additional e!ect of the recipient’s score in case
the donor has a score. As shown in Table 7, the coe"cient for the interaction
term is significantly (p < 5%) negative if we restrict the analysis to the recipients
with full score, supporting the third hypothesis that the impact of the recipient’s
score is weaker if the donor has a score. If we consider all recipients with a score,
however, the coe"cient is again negative, but far from significant (p > 40%).
One could argue that the positive relation between the recipient’s score and
the helping probability does not result from indirect reciprocity, but rather from
a learning process. Donors might want to find out what is a successful score and
may use the observed scores as orientation. Trying to adapt the own score to the
observed recipients’ scores would imply to help when one observes a high score
and not to help when one observes a low score (though this should strictly be
so only in early periods or if subjects are highly myopic, because otherwise the
total information one has gathered so far should dominate this period’s recip-
ient’s score). This potential interpretation, however, appears to be valid only
for donors with score, because donors without a score do not have an incen-
tive to find out what constitutes a successful score. The support for our third
hypothesis, that the relation between recipient’s score and helping probability
is stronger for donors without a score thus contradicts this interpretation and
suggests that what we see is indeed indirect reciprocity.
Our a"rmative result on the third hypothesis has a potentially important,
though at the current state somewhat speculative, implication. If the share of
subjects with public score was higher, but the helping rates (conditional on the
recipient’s score) for donors with and without public score were not a!ected,
average helping rates would be higher, but the incentives to help in order to
build a reputation would be weaker.
18The fit of the model is in general not very good because donors’ behavior is quite heteroge-
nous. This, however, rather strengthens the result since still a clear e!ect can be detected.
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Coe"cient Std. Error z Pr > |z|
All ! 0.5641 0.0650 8.681 0.000
R $ 0.4402 0.0771 5.709 0.000
with % -0.0673 0.0963 -0.699 0.485
score const -0.0573 0.0553 -1.035 0.300
R ! 0.7614 0.0790 9.636 0.000
with $ 0.5685 0.0926 6.138 0.000
full % -0.2539 0.1186 -2.141 0.032
score const -0.2054 0.0616 -3.333 0.001
Table 7: Coe"cients for the recipient’s score (!), for a dummy whether the
donor has a score ($) and for the interaction term (%) in random e!ects cross-
sectional time-series regression for the help choice
Confirming straightforward intuition, strategic reputation building pays,
whereas reciprocity does not. Table 8 shows the average payo!s (relative to
the average payo!s in the session) of subjects by being reciprocal and strate-
gic, where we summarized the subjects who were classified as pure or strong
strategists as strongly strategic and those that were classified as weakly or non-
strategic as weakly strategic. Clearly, the strongly strategic outperform the
weakly strategic, which does not come as a surprise because being strategic
implies, at the same own score, lower costs for helping others. The advan-
tage of the strongly strategic players is, however, remarkably large.19 More
importantly, it pays not to be reciprocal, apparently because being reciprocal
distracts from perfectly fine-tuning the own score (or, in case of private scores,
is a pure waste).20 This indicates that in an evolutionary game based on this
repeated helping game and with the experimentally observed player types, the
purely strategic non-reciprocal types would drive out the other types and would
eventually undermine the cooperation. Given that the relative payo! of the
non-reciprocal strongly strategic players is almost twice that of the reciprocal
19 If we study the data in a more disaggregated way, we find that the payo! for the pure
strategic is slightly higher than that for the strongly strategic and the payo! for the weakly
strategic is substantially higher than for the non-strategic. Since the numbers of observations
is too low for some categories in some sessions to derive meaningful results and since the
largest di!erence is between strongly strategic and weakly strategic we aggregated the data
in two categories for the present analysis.
20According to both Mann-Whitney and two-sample t-tests, the di!erences in relative pay-
o!s between strongly strategic and weakly strategic subjects are significant (p < 2% for the
non-reciprocal, p < 1% for the reciprocal and p < 0.1% for the whole sample), but those
between reciprocal and non-reciprocal subjects are not (p > 10% for the strongly strategic,
the weakly strategic and the whole sample.) In these tests we used the relative payo!s of
individuals as independent observations, which is admittedly not perfectly clean. Since it is
unclear how payo!s relative to the session average should not be independent within sessions,
however, we consider this acceptable. For a stricter test, the average relative payo!s are larger
for the strongly strategic than for the weakly strategic in all 5 sessions (for the non-reciprocal,
for the reciprocal as well as for the whole sample) and hence we can reject the hypothesis
that the strongly strategic do not better at p = 5%. The non-reciprocal do better than the
reciprocal in only four sessions and hence this test also misses statistical significance.
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Strongly Strategic Weakly Strategic Total
Reciprocal 1.14 (20) 0.69 (19) 0.92 (39)
Non-Reciprocal 1.23 (23) 0.87 (18) 1.08 (41)
Total 1.19 (43) 0.78 (37)
Table 8: Payo!s relative to average session payo! for pure or strongly strategic
versus weakly or non-strategic and for reciprocal versus non-reciprocal players,
number of players in the respective category in parantheses.
Average Helping Rate over Periods
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Figure 4: Average helping rates over all sessions for the respective 40 periods of
the first and the second half of the experiment
weakly strategic players, the evolutionary process would be quite fast for any
su"ciently payo!-sensitive dynamic.
Figure 4 shows the development of the average helping rates in the first 40
and the second 40 periods. While there is a clear drop in the last two periods in
both cases, the helping rate is remarkably stable until the third to last. Since
the value of a high score decreases sharply towards the end of the experiment,
one might have expected helping rates to drop before. Overall, the helping rate
is somewhat lower in the second half of the experiment (51%) than in the first
(56%). In the individual sessions, this e!ect is not consistent. The di!erence is
reversed in one session and virtually zero (0.3%) in another.
Seinen and Schram (2001) analyze the development of di!erent group norms,
which are apparent minimal scores that donors demand from a recipient in
order to help him or her and which they also try to keep up to themselves.
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own score 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
public score
-
0
1
0.64
0.82
0.57
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0.73
0.78
0.55
0.92
0.69
private score
0.09
0.03
0.32
0.15
0.61
0.34
0.55
0.44
0.78
0.45
0.97
0.85
Table 9: Average helping rates for donors who have been recipients in the
last interaction and have been helped (top) and not been helped (bottom), by
donor’s score and score status.
They find that over time di!erent groups tend to adopt di!erent norms, since
di!erent groups tend towards di!erent helping rates and di!erences between
groups increase over time. We see relatively little evidence for similar tendencies
in our data. In both parts of the experiment, helping rates in the first 10 periods
di!er about as much as in periods 21-30. And they even di!er less in the last 10
periods with the exception of a stronger end-game e!ect in session 3. That e!ect
can be attributed to the high number of strongly strategic players in session 3
and thus it does not indicate the development of a di!erent norm, but rather
more violations of the norm.
We also find some support for the alternative notion of indirect reciprocity
that players help who have recently been helped. When comparing the average
help rates of donors who have been recipients in the last interaction and have
been helped with those who have been recipients in the last interaction and
have not been helped (see Table 9), we see that for all possible own scores the
help rate is higher for the former (one has to consider donors with di!erent
scores separately, because otherwise one might incorrectly conclude that being
helped increases the probability of helping if in fact donors who have helped
more frequently in the past do so in the present but are also helped more fre-
quently). For donors with a (high) public score, it is not entirely clear whether
this result really indicates such a form of indirect reciprocity or whether it rather
results from subjects realizing that a high score has benefitted them. For donors
without public score the e!ect is also present which provides more conclusive
evidence for this form of indirect reciprocity. It is, however, not very consistent
in the individual sessions.
4 Related Literature
4.1 Standing Strategy as an Alternative to Image Scoring
Our experiment has pointed out that subjects react to the strategic incentives
that are caused by future donors’ indirect reciprocity. This implies that they
face a trade-o! when they meet a recipient who has a low score. If they are
motivated by indirect reciprocity they want to punish this player. Punishing
by not giving, however, deteriorates the own score. Hence the own indirect
reciprocal motivation may be in conflict with the strategic incentives implied
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by future donors’ indirect reciprocal actions. Furthermore, as pointed out by
Leimar and Hammerstein (2001), a system based on image scoring is suscepti-
ble to exploitation by strategic score optimizers. These problems can only be
avoided if higher order information is provided, for instance information about
the score of the previous partners of the current recipient.
Sugden (1986) analyzes a model with higher order information and what he
calls “standing strategy”. A player is in “good standing” as long as he has helped
or has refused to help a recipient not in good standing, but loses good standing
if he does not help a recipient in good standing. Leimar and Hammerstein
(2001) show that the standing strategy is evolutionarily stable if the horizon is
su"ciently long and the probability of execution errors is small, but considerably
larger than the probability of perception errors. They show in simulations that
even in a case where these conditions are not all fulfilled, the standing strategy
is dominating the population and hence while it is not evolutionary stable, it is
more robust than an indirectly reciprocal strategy based on a cut-o! strategy.
Bolton, Katok, and Ockenfels (2001) conducted an experimental helping
game where donors in one treatment were informed only about the current
recipient’s last choice in the donor role, but in another treatment they were
also informed about the recipient’s score in that interaction. The underlying
model of Bolton et al. (2001) hence corresponds for the former treatment to
image scoring models, while for the latter treatment it is conceptually closer to
that analyzed by Sugden (1986). A crucial di!erence, however, is that in the
situation analyzed by Sugden, there is an incentive both to punish a defector and
to help a player who has punished whereas in the underlying model of Bolton et
al. there is no incentive to help a punishing player because if one does not help a
recipient who has not helped lately, future partners cannot detect whether one
has refrained to help an exploiter or a punisher. Hence cooperation based on
good standing is more robust than that based on the second order information
in the underlying model of Bolton et al.
In Bolton et al. (2001) the presence of second order information clearly in-
creases cooperation, implying that “deeper” information (looking back deeper
into the history of play) fosters helping, whereas our results suggest that “more”
information (a higher share of players with a public score) might also have ad-
verse e!ects. The first order information has the strongest influence when the
second order information was “help”, i.e. for the own probability of being helped
it is most important how one has last treated another player who has helped.
This would be consistent with the conclusion that donors try to follow a stand-
ing strategy. If the current recipient’s last recipient had helped the last time
he was the donor (and hence was unambiguously in good standing), the current
recipient’s standing can be determined and thus guide the current donor’s de-
cision. In contrast, if the current recipient’s last recipient had not helped the
last time he was the donor, the information is not su"cient to determine this
player’s standing and hence also the current recipient’s standing. Therefore, the
information on the current recipient is ambiguous and is thus not expected to
have a clear impact on the current donor’s decision.
The results of Bolton et al. (2001) agree with ours to the extent that they
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find that strategic incentives (e.g. costs) matter. In their study this is also shown
by a clear end-game e!ect, similar to our results. Given that in our study the
score is based on several periods, one might, however, expect helping rates to
drop substantially before the second to last period, which they do not. Bolton
et al. (2001) also find that being helped increases the probability of helping in
the next period, consistent with the alternative notion of indirect reciprocity
suggested by Boyd and Richerson (1989).
Similar to the approach by Bolton et al. (2001), Milinski et al. (2001) com-
pare treatments with first and second order information, but they provide infor-
mation about all the preceding choices of the recipient and his or her previous
recipients, not only about the respective last choices. Furthermore, subjects
have the opportunity to track also higher order information, because all deci-
sions are made public and subjects are given names throughout the experiment.
While Milinski et al. (2001) find that second order information is taken into
account to some extent, they interpret their data to be overall rather in line
with an image scoring strategy than with a standing strategy because observed
helping rates (for a specific group of players, i.e. those that did not help a re-
cipient who had not helped before and were hence not to blame according to
a standing strategy) are not significantly di!erent from expected helping rates
under an image scoring strategy (though they were higher) but are significantly
lower than expected helping rates under a standing strategy. It appears that
subjects took the information that was explicitly provided (first and second or-
der) into account, but were not capable of (or not interested in) keeping track
of higher order information.
To us, an e!ective test of a standing strategy appears di"cult to design. An
experimental design that provides su"cient information for a standing strategy
would either overwhelm subjects with information (if it provides them with the
necessary third, fourth and higher order information, as in Milinski et al., 2001)
or it would directly suggest to use a standing strategy by providing information
about the standing explicitly. Outside the laboratory, people might be able to
develop e"cient mechanisms to keep track of others’ standing, whereas in an
experiment, time might be too short to develop such an e"cient mechanism.
In particular, in non-anonymous interaction outside the laboratory, information
about another’s past might be retrieved from memory via emotional reactions,
which appears to be much harder in an experiment where identification is only
via fictitious names or player numbers.
4.2 E!ects of Reputation across Games
Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck (2002a, 2002b) study how an image score
acquired in one game (or individual decision) influences the behavior in another.
In the experiment by Milinski et al. (2002a) a public goods game is combined
with a helping game, where donors are also informed about the recipient’s choice
in preceding rounds of the public goods game. They find that contributions in
the public goods game deteriorate if first eight periods of the public goods game
are conducted and then eight rounds of the helping game. In contrast, if rounds
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of the public goods game and the helping game alternate, contributions in the
public goods game stay at a substantially and significantly higher level. Fur-
thermore, contributions in subsequent rounds of the public goods game decline
quickly if subjects are informed that no further rounds of the helping game fol-
low, but do not if subjects are not given this information. These results confirm
that subjects clearly follow the strategic incentives to build a reputation. In
the design, however, elements of direct and indirect reciprocity are combined.
Rewards and punishment in the helping game of previous behavior in the pub-
lic goods game are clearly a form of direct reciprocity because the donor was
a!ected by the recipient’s behavior in the public goods game. Hence the main
result shows that subjects strategically react to the possibility of direct reci-
procity, not indirect reciprocity. The experiment provides, however, again clear
evidence for indirect reciprocity (and even of a similar impact than that of direct
reciprocity), because the decisions in the helping game influence the probability
to be helped as much as the decisions in the public goods game.
The experiment by Milinski et al. (2002b) shows that donations made to
charity (UNICEF) significantly increase the probability to be helped in a helping
game. Hence indirect reciprocity does not only occur within closed groups, but
also helping outsiders can improve the own chances of receiving help.
5 Conclusions
We have conducted an experimental helping game where at any time only half of
the subjects have a public score and hence a strategic incentive to help. Thus we
can study both pure non-strategic indirect reciprocity and the impact of strate-
gic incentives. The interaction of donors with and without public score is the
fundamental di!erence to the helping experiment by Seinen and Schram (2001).
In their experiment, all subjects could build up an image score (or none in the
control treatment) and hence it is not possible to clearly distinguish between
helping choices that result purely from a motivation for indirect reciprocity and
helping choices that are driven by attempts to improve the own score.
We are the first to find clear evidence for indirect reciprocity even in the
absence of strategic incentives for reputation building, but we also find very
strong e!ects of strategic reputation building. Specifically, 80% of subjects
react to strategic incentives, including more than 50% whose helping rates more
than double and 25% who only help when they have an incentive to do so.21
This is in contrast to the indirect evidence by Seinen and Schram (2001) who
classify more than half of the players as non-strategic and in particular find
substantially more simple altruists and simple egoists, types that are virtually
absent in our experiment.
21An alternative explanation for the observed higher helping rates of donors with a public
score could be that some donors want to set an example for what they believe to be the right
thing to do. Without a public score only the recipient becomes aware of their choice, whereas
with a public score their future donors learn their past behavior, which enhances the scope
for setting an example.
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We also find support for our hypothesis that the subjects who have a public
score and hence a strategic incentive to help, exhibit a somewhat weaker re-
ciprocal behavior than subjects who do not have a public score. Hence while
strategic incentives to build up an image score increase an individual’s general
propensity to help, it weakens the influence of pure indirect reciprocity. A po-
tential implication is that in a population with a higher share of subjects with a
public score, the incentives for strategic reputation building could be weakened.
Concerning the empirical relevance of the invasion predicted by Leimar and
Hammerstein (2001), we clearly find strategic non-reciprocal players who also
receive higher payo!s than other types. This casts some doubt on the evolu-
tionary explanation for cooperation based on indirect reciprocity suggested by
Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) because the types predicted to undermine the co-
operation by exploiting the system are clearly present and more successful. Put
di!erently, the argument by Leimar and Hammerstein (2001) that the set of
potential types chosen in the simulations by Nowak and Sigmund (1998a) is too
restricted is not only valid on theoretical grounds, but is also strongly supported
by our experimental data. The exploiting types are out there, so any simulation
or evolutionary model that tries to explain some phenomenon in the human so-
ciety has to take them into account. Therefore, an evolutionary explanation for
the presence of indirect reciprocity (that is documented by several experiments,
including ours) has to be richer in structure to explain why reciprocal players
might survive in the presence of non-reciprocal strategic players. One might
argue on the other hand, that the exploiters are a relatively new phenomenon
and that we are still in the take-over process. While this view might be correct,
we consider it too depressing to share.
References
[1] Alexander, Richard D., 1987. The Biology of Moral Systems. New York:
Aldine de Gruyter.
[2] Andreoni, James and Petrie, Ragan, 2001. “Social Motives to Giving: Can
these Explain Fund Raising Institutions?”, Working paper, University of
Wisconsin.
[3] Berg, Joyce, Dickhaut, John, and McCabe, Kevin, 1995. “Trust, Reci-
procity and Social History.” Games and Economic Behavior 10, 122—142.
[4] Blount, Sally, 1995. “When Social Outcomes Aren’t Fair: The E!ect of
Causal Attributions on Preferences.” Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 1995, 63, 131—144.
[5] Bolton, Gary E., Katok, Elena, and Ockenfels, Axel, 2001. “What’s in a
Reputation? Indirect Reciprocity in an Image Scoring Game.” Working
paper, Penn State University.
21
[6] Bolton, Gary E., Katok, Elena, and Ockenfels, Axel, 2002. “How E!ective
Are Online Reputation Mechanisms? — An Experimental Investigation.”
Working paper, Penn State University.
[7] Bolton, Gary E. and Ockenfels, Axel, 2000. “ERC — A Theory of Equity,
Reciprocity, and Competition.” American Economic Review, 90, 166—193.
[8] Boyd, R. and Richerson, P. J., 1989. “The Evolution of Indirect Reci-
procity.” Social Networks 11, 213—236.
[9] Charness, Gary, 2002. “Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental
Labor Market.” Forthcoming in Journal of Labor Economics.
[10] Charness, Gary and Rabin, Matthew, 2002. “Understanding Social Prefer-
ences with Simple Tests.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 817—869.
[11] Cox, James, 2002. “How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity.”Working paper,
University of Arizona.
[12] Dufwenberg, Martin and Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2000. “A Theory of Sequen-
tial Reciprocity.”Working paper, CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg.
[13] Falk, Armin and Fischbacher, Urs, 1999. “A theory of Reciprocity.”Work-
ing paper No. 6, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University
of Zurich.
[14] Fehr, Ernst, Kirchsteiger, Georg, and Riedl, Arno, 1993. “Does Fairness
Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation.” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 108, 437—460.
[15] Fehr, Ernst and Schmidt, Klaus, 1999. “A Theory of Fairness, Competition,
and Cooperation.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817—868.
[16] Fischbacher, Urs, 1999. “Z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Readymade Economic
Experiments.” Working paper No. 21, Institute for Empirical Research in
Economics, University of Zurich.
[17] Harbaugh, William T., 1998. “The Prestige Motive for Making Charitable
Transfers.” American Economic Review, 88, 277—282.
[18] Heijden, Eline C. M. van der, 1996.Altruism, Fairness and Public Pensions.
PhD Thesis, Tilburg University.
[19] Keser, Claudia, 2002. “Trust and Reputation Building in e-Commerce”
Working paper, IBM T. J. Watson Research Center.
[20] Leimar, Olof and Hammerstein, Peter, 2001. “Evolution of Cooperation
through Indirect Reciprocity.” Proceedings Royal Society London: Biologi-
cal Sciences 268, 745—753.
22
[21] Levine, David K., 1998 “Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experi-
ments.” Review of Economic Dynamics, 1(3), 593—622.
[22] Milinski, Manfred, Semmann, Dirk, and Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen, 2002a.
“Reputation Helps Solve the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’.” Nature 415, 424—
426.
[23] Milinski, Manfred, Semmann, Dirk, and Krambeck, Hans-Jürgen, 2002b.
“Donors to Charity Gain both Indirect Reciprocity and Political Reputa-
tion.” Proceedings Royal Society London: Biological Sciences 269, 881—883.
[24] Milinski, Manfred, Semmann, Dirk, Bakker, Theo C. M., and Krambeck,
Hans-Jürgen, 2001. “Cooperation through Indirect Reciprocity: Image
Scoring or Standing Strategy?” Proceedings Royal Society London: Bio-
logical Sciences 268, 2495—2501.
[25] Nowak, Martin A. and Sigmund, Karl, 1998a. “Evolution of Indirect Reci-
procity by Image Scoring.” Nature 393, 573—577.
[26] Nowak, Martin A. and Sigmund, Karl, 1998b. “The Dynamics of Indirect
Reciprocity.”. Journal of Theoretical Biology 194, 561—574.
[27] Rabin, Matthew, 1993. “Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Eco-
nomics.” American Economic Review, 83, 1281—1302.
[28] Seinen, Ingrid and Schram, Arthur, 2001. “Social Status and Group Norms:
Indirect Reciprocity in a Helping Experiment.” Working paper, CREED,
University of Amsterdam.
[29] Sugden, R., 1986. The Economics of Rights, Co-operation and Welfare.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
[30] Wedekind, Claus and Milinski, Manfred, 2000. “Cooperation through Im-
age Scoring in Humans.” Science 288, 850—852.
23
Appendix: Instructions
(Original Instructions were in German)
General Instructions
You are taking part in an economic experiment, which is being financed by various research pro-
moting foundations. If you read the following instructions carefully, you can - depending on the
decisions you will make - influence your own earnings as well as the earnings of the other partici-
pants of this experiment. It is, therefore, important that you pay attention to the instructions
given below.
The instructions distributed are intended for your personal information only. Absolutely no
communication whatsoever is allowed for the duration of the experiment. Please address
questions you might have to us directly. Violation of this rule leads to the exclusion both from
the experiment itself and from all pertaining payments.
The experiment is divided into periods. During this experiment we do not deal with francs, but
with points. Your income from each period will, therefore, be calculated in points. The total
amount of points achieved in the course of the experiment will be converted into francs at the
rate of
1 point equals 10 rappen [100 rappen = 1 Swiss Franc].
At the beginning of the experiment you are allotted an endowment of 100 points, thus represent-
ing 10 francs.
In each period you form a group with one other participant. These groups of two are in each pe-
riod newly formed at random. It is possible, though not probable, that you will be linked with the
same participant in two consecutive periods. You cannot recognize the other participants, and
hence do not know whether you have been in a group together with the current other participant
before. This guarantees the anonymity of your decision.
Each group consists of one participant with the part A and one participant with the part B. Both
parts are, in each period, randomly and independently assigned. The probability of being assigned
part A for a period is 50 %, irrespective of the part held in the previous period. Therefore, it is
possible that you will assume part A or part B in several consecutive periods.
2Specific Instructions for the Experiment’s Procedure
Decisions to be made by the participants
During each period, in which you assume part A, you determine whether or not you want to help
the other participant of your group (who holds part B). If you assume part B no decision is re-
quired from you. If you, as the holder of part A, decide to help the other participant of your
group, you will be charged with a cost of 6 points, and the other participant of your group is
given 15 points. If you decide not to help the other participant of your group, you suffer no cost,
and the other participant receives nothing, resulting, for both of you, in the same amount of
points as at the beginning of the period.
Participants’ information types
The participants differ from each other insofar as other participants are, or are not, informed of
the decisions made. Participants, whose decisions are communicated to the other participants, are
referred to as Info types. The experiment comprises two stages consisting of 40 periods each. At
stage one, i.e. during the first 40 periods, one half of the participants are info types. At stage two,
the other half of the participants become info types. Thus, you will, like all other participants, be
an info type either during the first 40 periods or during the second 40 periods. You will always
know if you are an info type or not. If during the first 40 periods you were an info type, we will
inform you at the end of these 40 periods that for the rest of the experiment you will no longer be
an info type and vice-versa. Regardless whether you are an info type or not, you can in each pe-
riod be matched both with another info type or to a non-info type.
Information on info types
The last five decisions made by the info types are being computer-saved, i.e. saved will be the
number of times an info type (with part A) granted help and the number of times he denied help.
When an info type then assumes part B, this information is given to the other participant of the
group (assuming part A). This means that the participant with part A learns how many times the
participant with part B granted help during the last five periods and how many times he did not.
If at this stage the participant with part B assumed part A in less than five periods, the participant
with part A is informed of decisions B made in these periods.
If a participant is not an info type, no information on his decision-making is saved. In particular
this means that no-one is informed about the decisions made at the stage where one is not an info
type. Thus if at stage two of the experiment you are an info type, no information on the decisions
you made at stage one will be passed on to another participant.
Participants with part B are given no information on participants with part A.
3If you are an info type, whose current decisions as participant with part A are passed on to later
participants assuming part A, you are, at the beginning of a period, informed of how you decided
during the last five periods with part A (or during less than these five periods if you assumed part
A less than five times). This information is submitted to you regardless of which part, A or B,
you assume.
Stage two of the experiment
On completion of the 40 periods of stage one and after a short break we will get started with
stage two, again consisting of 40 periods. The info types of stage one are no longer info types,
and the non-info types of stage one become the info types of stage two. At stage two, all infor-
mation on the decisions made at stage one are no longer available. This means that the number of
periods with part A about which information is released, starts at zero for all participants.
However, the amount of points earned at stage one are carried over to stage two.
4Procedure on the Computer
The screen shown to both participants is divided in two sections. The upper section of the
screen is independent on whether you assume part A or part B.
Information given in the upper section of the screen
Each period reveals, in the upper section of the screen, the part you assumed in the previous
period as well as the decision the participant with part A made in the last period (see figures 1
and 2 below). Furthermore, you are shown your actual balance of points. As an info type you will
also see how many times during the last five periods as A (or during all previous periods as A, if
they amount to less than five) you granted help to the participant with part B and how many
times you denied it (see the example in figure 1). This is for your information. In the example in
Figure 1 you have been the participant with part A during the last period, granting help to the
participant with part B. During the last five periods with part A, you granted help twice and de-
nied it three times. The current balance is 121 points. The example in Figure 2 shows the upper
section of the screen, if you are not an info type. During the last period you assumed part B and
were granted help. Your current balance is 121 points.
Decision-making section for participants A
If you are the participant with part A, you make your decision in the lower section of the screen.
If the other participant of your group, i.e. the participant with part B, is an info type, you are in-
formed about B’s last five decisions (i.e. about the last five periods where he assumed part A). In
the event that the other participant of your group, i.e. the participant with part B, is no info type,
you are informed about the fact that no information is released to you. The screen below shows
that the participant with part B granted help three times and denied it twice during the last five
periods where he assumed the part of A.
Below you will see the following question: “Do you help participant B in this period?” beside
the two fields “Yes” and “No”. Mouse-click one of these fields and activate the “OK” button. If
you choose “Yes” your balance of points will be reduced by 6 points and participant B’s
balance will be increased by 15 points. If you choose “No” neither your nor participant B’s
balance will be changed.
Besides, you will learn if you are an info type, which in this example applies. Thus your decision
will in future periods, where you assume part B, be revealed to the participant with part A as
long as these decisions belong to your last five decisions as the participant with part A and as
long as you are at the same stage of the experiment.
5Figure 1: Screen for participants with part A
Period
                                         13    of    40
In the last period you were participant A. You granted help.
As A during the last 5 periods
You granted help twice
You denied help three times.
Current balance of your points: 121
During this period you are participant A
Your participant B during the last 5 periods as A
Granted help three times
denied help twice.
Do you help participant B in this period    !   Yes
                                                                 !    No
Your decisions will be revealed to your future participants A
OK
6Lower section of the screen for participants with part B
The lower part of the screen only informs you that during this period you are not to make any
decision.
Figure 2: Screen for participants with part B
Period
                                         16    of    40
In the last period you were participant B. You were granted help.
Current balance of your points: 121
You are participant B. During this period you make no decision.
continue
7Control Questionnaire
Please answer all questions. Wrong answers have no consequences whatsoever! Address any
questions to us!
1. Participant A has 121 points, participant B has 112 points. Participant A helps participant
B. The balance of points of the participants is:
participant A: ............
participant B: ............
2. Participant A has 145 points, participant B has 127 points. Participant A denies participant
B help. The balance of points of the participants is:
participant A: ............
participant B: ............
3. Suppose you are an info type. During the last five periods you made the following deci-
sions: “help denied”, “help denied”, “help granted”, “help granted”, and “help denied” (in
this sequence). You are now again A. In the event that you now help and that in the next
period you assume part B: which information on your decisions will be released to partici-
pant A?
you granted help ............ times
you denied help ............ times
4. Suppose that during the first stage of the experiment you are an info type. In how many
periods, at the most, is the decision you make in period 37 revealed to another participant?
5. Suppose you had the part of B three consecutive times. What is the probability of you again
assuming part B during the next period?
